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SUMMARY 
A  lightweight  role-based  access  control  policy  authoring  tool  was  developed  for  e-
Scientists,  a  community  where  access  policies  have  to  be  implemented  for  an 
increasingly  heterogeneous  group  of  local  and  remote  users.    Two  fundamental 
problems were identified (1) lack of understanding what the policy components are (i.e. 
how  authorization  policies  are  structured),  and  (2)  lack  of  understanding  of  the 
underlying policy paradigm (i.e. what should go into the policy, and what should be left 
out).  Conceptual design (CD) techniques were used to revise the user interface (UI) 
labels so that e-Scientists and developers were better able to  describe access policy 
components from labels, and match labels with components (t=6.28, df=7, p=.000 two 
tailed).  CD, instructional text, bubble help, UI behaviour and alert boxes were used to 
shape  users’  models  of  the  policy  paradigm.    The  final  prototype  improved  users’ 
efficiency and effectiveness by: more than doubling the speed with which expert users 
could  write  authorization  policies;  and  facilitating  users  without  specialist  security 
knowledge to overcome the policy paradigm and components problems, enabling them 
to complete 80% of basic and 75% of advanced authorization policy writing tasks in a 
usability trial. 
1  Introduction 
This paper presents a case study in which usability techniques were applied to make a tool for 
writing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies more accessible to e-Scientists.  e-Scientists 
share  their  equipment,  data,  and  software  with  increasingly  large  groups  of  geographically 
distributed collaborators, and consequently they face the need to protect the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of their resources from unauthorized access and malicious attacks.   
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Grids  share  computer  resources  to  an  unprecedented  level.    As  the  number  of  users  and  the 
connectedness of e-Science resources increases, so does the importance and difficulty of granting 
appropriate authorization and access to these resources.  An easy to use tool is needed to support the 
granting of access rights.  Because a Grid environment is such a severe test for writing correct 
authorization  policies,  e-Scientists’  need  for  a  usable  authorization  policy  management  tool  is 
particularly great.   
This paper describes part of the effort to provide such a tool for the e-Scientist – a general tool to 
create  and  edit  authorization  policies  that  can  subsequently  be  enforced  by  the  PERMIS 
authorization infrastructure [4].  Most implementations of role based access controls are designed to 
be used by system administrators – highly technical people with expertise in access control, and a 
desire  to  read  the  manual  [30].    This  paper  is  an  attempt  at  making  a  state-of-the-art,  flexible 
authorization infrastructure available to e-Scientists – users who are less technically capable than the 
system administrators who usually employ role based access controls, and far less motivated by 
security. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We start by introducing the security concepts and 
technologies that are relevant to this paper i.e. authorization, role based access controls, and the 
PERMIS authorization infrastructure. We then review previous literature in the area of security and 
usability before presenting our case study findings. Stages of our tool’s development, focusing on 
usability  issues,  are  outlined,  along  with  each  stage’s  methods,  their  results  and  subsequent 
diagnoses  for  improvements.    We  conclude  with  a  discussion  of  our  positive  and  negative 
experiences of introducing usability into the design process. 
2  Security Concepts and Technologies 
2.1  Authorization 
Authorization is a critical part of security. Saltzer and Schroeder define authorization as “grant(ing) 
a principal access to certain information” [20]. Coming after identification (the user saying who she 
is) and authentication (verifying that the user is really who she says she is), authorization says what 
the  user  is  allowed  to  do.    Authorization  mechanisms  provide  safeguards  against  benign  users 
mistakenly accessing confidential information that they are not entitled to see, as well as against 
attackers  attempting  to  hijack  computing  and  information  resources  and  using  them  for  illegal 
purposes. (Note that no security mechanism is 100% secure against all forms of attack; we usually 
only provide cost effective security mechanisms commensurate with the risk exposure.) 
Authorization infrastructures typically comprise two parts. Firstly, a mechanism for granting access 
rights to users, and secondly a mechanism for controlling or enforcing those rights (often called 
access control systems). Access control systems are most frequently part of a computer's operating 
system.  They monitor any requests for access, for example to read, write, or change data.  When a 
request to perform an operation on the computer is made, it is checked against a statement of policy 
saying who is authorized to do what, usually held in the form of an access control list.  If the request 
passes the policy test, it is allowed.  If it fails, the request is denied and the requested action is 
stopped before it can begin. Inserting entries into the access control list is the mechanism used to 
grant access rights to users. Traditionally each application and operating system has had its own 
proprietary authorization mechanism, implemented as an integral part of the application or operating 
system code. This leads to a large administrative burden, since administrators need to learn to use 
different software tools in order to manage each application, and need to configure different access 
rights into each piece of software. Furthermore it is difficult, if not impossible, to have a consistent 
authorization policy across all applications and operating systems since the underlying access control 
models and mechanisms vary from system  to system. When one considers the large distributed 
nature of Grid computing, with the hundreds, if not thousands, of different systems that are involved, 
one can see that managing the authorization of Grid users across Grid applications becomes a huge 
burden on administrators. Reducing this burden is one of the primary objectives of the project that is 
reported here. .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  3  
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2.2  Role Based Access Controls 
Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) are a type of access control that is designed to reduce the 
administrative burden of access control management. Early work by Sandhu and colleagues [21] led 
to the eventual publication of RBAC as a NIST standard [16]. The key feature of RBAC is that a 
level  of  indirection  is  introduced between users and their authorized  actions on resources. This 
intermediate concept is termed a role. So whilst an access control list says which actions a user is 
allowed to perform on which resources, in RBAC, role assignments state  which roles a user is 
allowed  to  assert  or  possess,  whilst  role  specifications  state  which  actions  a  role  (holder)  is 
authorized  to perform  on which  resources.  Access  control  management  is  significantly  reduced 
because typically the number of roles in an organization is less than 4% of the number of employees 
[23]. 
2.3  The PERMIS Authorization System 
PERMIS is a RBAC authorization system that uses X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) [10] to hold 
users’ roles. X.509 attribute certificates are digitally signed by the role assigner so that they cannot 
be unknowingly tampered with, and thus can be transported safely across unsecured networks and 
stored  in  public  repositories  such  as  LDAP  directory  services.  PERMIS  has  an  access  control 
decision  engine  that  makes  authorization  decisions  (granted  or  denied)  on  behalf  of  its  clients 
(applications and operating systems) based on the roles belonging to a user, the action the user 
wishes to perform, and the current authorization policy. The PERMIS authorization policy states 
which managers are trusted to assign which roles to which users (this is called the role assignment 
policy - RAP), and which roles are authorized to perform which actions on which resources (this is 
called the target access policy - TAP). If a user presents a role that is not trusted by the RAP, it will 
be discarded by the decision engine. If a user requests access to a resource that is not authorized by 
the TAP, the request will be denied. The PERMIS default policy is deny everything except that 
which is specifically granted in the current authorization policy.  Clearly it is important that the 
administrator  of  a  PERMIS  controlled  resource,  be  it  an  application  such  as  a  database  or  an 
operating system resource such as a filestore, knows how to create correct PERMIS authorization 
policies so that only the correct set of users are given the correct set of access rights to the resources 
that are being protected. Hence it is vitally important that the PERMIS policy management tool is 
correctly designed so as to be user friendly and intuitive to its administrators. 
2.4  e-Science and PERMIS 
e-Science is a program and movement to facilitate academic and commercial research in the sciences 
through better use of existing computing resources.  This usually involves combining the resources 
of many computers together so that they are presented to the e-Scientist as a single, much greater 
resource.    Inherent  in  this  program  is  the  sharing  of  resources  and  data  across  administrative 
boundaries.  Different departments within a university might pool their compute-farms, and different 
universities  might then pool  these  combined pools  into  a  much  larger  computational  grid.   For 
example, the GridPP project spans 19 institutions, and is aiming to combine over 4,000 CPUs [3].  
Sharing across administrative boundaries leads to the forming of virtual organisations (VOs), where 
each institution administers its data or resources (it is unwilling to relinquish control over them, and 
may have legal duties not to) but allows limited access to other members of the VO.  VOs such as 
these form a difficult test case for authorisation systems, particularly when their administration is 
being put in the hands of non-experts – the e-Scientists themselves. 
PERMIS is an infrastructure that allows Role-Based Access Control to be implemented in e-Science 
systems,  such  as  but  not  limited  to  computational  Grids.    PERMIS  consists  of  an  application 
gateway (the decision engine), surrounding the Grid node, which looks up users’ X.509 attribute-
certificates (ACs) in an LDAP directory in response to their requests for access.  The ACs contain 
the users’ roles, which are compared against the policy on the Grid node listing the permitted roles 
and their access rights, and a decision to grant or deny access is made. A check is also carried out 
that the entity that issued the role AC to the user was authorized to do so. 4        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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PERMIS simplifies access control for managers of e-Science nodes through the use of the role based 
access control paradigm - privileges are given to roles rather than individual users.  Whilst the 
individuals who fulfill roles in an organization may come and go with relative frequency, the roles 
themselves are relatively unchanging.  In this paradigm, the access control task is simplified to 
giving  privileges  to  roles,  with  an  additional  job  of  distributing  roles  to  users.    The  latter 
management task is further simplified by delegating the task of distribution of role ACs to named 
individuals, called Sources of Authority (SOAs).  The manager of an e-Science node need only write 
the names of these SOAs into the access control policy at his/her node, and then (s)he can leave it up 
to  these  SOAs  (managers)  in  other  locations or  institutions  comprising  the  e-Science  project  to 
distribute the role ACs to their own users. 
3  Previous Related Research 
Very little research directly related to the topic of building a user friendly policy management tool is 
actually published. There are countless papers on access control models, including RBAC, countless 
papers on policy language design and policy related issues, a reasonable number of papers on role 
engineering and role lifecycles, but virtually nothing about the user centered design of a RBAC 
policy management tool. The first paper to be written on this topic was by Mary Ellen Zurko and 
colleagues [30] in 1999. They state,  
“Saltzer and Schroeder saw usability as a fundamental security principle, on a par with principles 
such as least privilege and fail-safe defaults. While these latter principles have become standards in 
the security literature, the user-centered principle has been honored more in the breach. Our work is 
the first that we know of that explicitly places security and usability as peer goals of an effort, and 
employs specific techniques to assure the achievement of both goals”.  
Part of their objective was to produce an RBAC policy management GUI for the US DOD. They, 
like us, recognized that security non-experts (they termed them casual users) would comprise a 
significant  proportion  of  the  user  community  that  would  need  to  write  RBAC  policies. 
Unfortunately, after they had built their first prototype policy management GUI, they were only able 
to test it with five users who were experienced in managing security for distributed applications. 
Thus a significant proportion of their intended user base was never utilized during their build and 
testing phases, which rather detracts from their results. Even so, when asked to evaluate their GUI 
representations  of  concepts  on  a  scale  from  obvious  to  confusing,  they  found  that  even  these 
experienced users found the following concepts somewhat confusing: actions, constraints, roles and 
labels. They concluded that further study was still required. We agree. If even experienced users 
found their terms somewhat confusing, then what would the casual users have made of them? This is 
one of the questions that are answered in our current work. Our work therefore goes further than the 
work of Zurko et.al, in that casual users were the main set of users that we used to test the various 
versions of our policy management GUI. However, experienced users were used as well. 
The next significant piece of research is by Ka-Ping Yee [28]. He proposes ten design principles for 
secure user interaction with systems. These are 
(i)  Path of Least Resistance. The most natural way to do any task should also be the most 
secure way. 
(ii)  Appropriate  Boundaries.  The  interface  should  expose,  and  the  system  should  enforce, 
distinctions between objects and between actions along boundaries that matter to the user. 
(iii)  Explicit Authorization. A user's authorities must only be provided to other actors as a result 
of an explicit user action that is understood to imply granting. 
(iv)  Visibility.  The  interface  should  allow  the  user  to  easily  review  any  active  actors  and 
authority relationships that would affect security-relevant decisions. 
(v)  Revocability. The interface should allow the user to easily revoke authorities that the user 
has granted, wherever revocation is possible. .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  5  
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(vi)  Expected Ability. The interface must not give the user the impression that it is possible to do 
something that cannot actually be done. 
(vii)  Trusted  Path.  The  interface  must  provide  an  unspoofable  and  faithful  communication 
channel between  the  user  and any  entity  trusted  to manipulate  authorities on the  user's 
behalf. 
(viii)  Identifability. The interface should enforce that distinct objects and distinct actions have 
unspoofably identifable and distinguishable representations. 
(ix)  Expressiveness. The interface should provide enough expressive power (a) to describe a safe 
security policy without undue difficulty; and (b) to allow users to express security policies 
in terms that fit their goals.  
(x)  Clarity.  The effect  of any security-relevant action must  be clearly  apparent  to the  user 
before the action is taken. [28]  
We have used these principles throughout our current work, and believe that all ten have been 
fulfilled in our final policy management tool.  However, we do not believe that usable security 
software can be guaranteed by following design heuristics alone, and that to do so could result in 
sub-optimal or even dangerous usability flaws.  At least, some user testing must be conducted on the 
resulting design.  In a more recent paper [29], Yee acknowledges that iterative design is essential to 
producing secure and usable software, but that few developers seem to incorporate security and 
usability testing throughout the design and build iterations. This has been one of the main objectives 
of the current project. 
The  final  significant piece of research is by Balfanz  et.al  [2]. They decided  to install  a secure 
wireless LAN in PARC using PKI certificates. The user enrollment process took the installers, all 
security and PKI experts, a couple of minutes to complete. Needless to say they were very surprised 
when the average time taken by normal users (who were all computing professionals with advanced 
degrees, mostly PhDs) was over 2 hours. As a result, they document five lessons from the field, 
which are: 
(i)  you can’t retrofit usable security, meaning security cannot be bolted on afterwards, it has to 
be built in from the start 
(ii)  tools aren’t solutions, meaning mechanisms such as SSL are good building blocks, but we 
are  still  missing  other  usually  higher  level  building  blocks    when  constructing  secure 
applications  
(iii)  mind the upper layers, meaning that security cannot only be handled in the lower layers. It 
must be built into the upper layers as well, which will require security to be implicit and 
much more user friendly. 
(iv)  keep your customers satisfied, meaning put users’ needs first, not those of the developers or 
even of the security officer. 
(v)  think locally, act locally, meaning that if security  mechanisms can be kept local to the 
current system, then co-ordination with external security mechanisms is not needed, which 
can significantly simplify the user interaction. 
As a result of their and our own experiences, we can now add a sixth lesson from the field, which is 
“security experts are mainly blind to normal users (lack of) ability to understand security concepts 
and terminology”. The reason for this blindness is totally understandable. An expert who uses a 
particular jargon and set of concepts daily, and who is completely familiar with their semantics and 
nuances, is simply not able to see what other people cannot see. The evidence for this sixth lesson 
comes from various sources. Balfanz et.al report that when they told other security experts it was 
taking users over 2 hours to perform PKI enrollment, the experts did not believe them, to the point of 
even suggesting that their empirical results must be incorrect. In our own work, reported later, we 
initially used concepts and labels for our management GUI that were the everyday lingo of the 
security experts who built the GUI. We were very surprised to find that the users who tested the first 
GUI prototype could not understand what these labels were meant to convey. Finally, as reported 6        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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earlier, the research by  Zurko  et.al. found  that even  their  experienced users found  some  of the 
concepts and terms used in their GUI to be somewhat confusing. Thus it is clear that in the design 
and labeling of all security interfaces, great care and early user testing is required in order to bridge 
the knowledge gap between the security experts and the normal users. 
3.1  The design problem 
PERMIS access control policies are actually formulated in XML. Originally they were written by 
hand by the developers and security experts (the power users of [30]).  XML policies have several 
advantages:  
(i)  They are machine processable and can be easily parsed and understood by the access control 
decision engine; 
(ii)  The content of them can be controlled by a DTD or schema thus ensuring that the manager 
creates syntactically correct policies; 
(iii)  Open source tools are available for manipulating XML data structures thereby reducing 
implementation costs. 
However,  the  PERMIS  developers  rightly  anticipated  that  writing  XML  policies  would  not  be 
efficient, intuitive or easy for e-Science node managers.  This is inevitable, as machine-readable 
security policies require an interpretive infrastructure (such as tags to denote different classes of 
policy items) to avoid ambiguity, which tend to add extra length and verbosity to the resulting 
policy.   
PERMIS XML policies are brief compared with alternatives such as Akenti’s
‡ or XACML [18], but 
still require significantly more verbiage than the same policy written in English.  For example, the 
same policy is written in English in Table 1 and in XML in Figure 1. 
In addition, since the tool’s intended users – e-Scientists in this case - were predicted to know 
nothing about PERMIS or RBAC, they would face a significant investment in time and effort to 
learn the necessary concepts before they would be able to write authorization policies.  However, e-
Scientists want security technology that is like “a scattering of magic dust” over their e-Science 
applications [9].  The current state of the art in RBAC requires significant investment in time and 
effort to learn its concepts, which is clearly not the desired “magic dust”.   
It was therefore decided to build a policy editor tool to assist users with RBAC concepts and produce 
the XML of policies for them, leaving the e-Science node managers to concentrate on the semantics 
of the policy.  Furthermore, it was decided to provide a graphical user interface (GUI), allowing 
drag-and-drop and point-and-click operations to further reduce the effort involved in implementing 
policies. 
 
 
                                                        
‡ See http://www-itg.lbl.gov/security/Akenti/ 
“All staff in the department can write files to laser printer x, Jim the administrator can write files, 
delete any files from the print queue, pause the printing, and resume the printing at the laser printer x. 
No one else is allowed access to the printer.” 
Table 1 – A brief PERMIS policy, in English .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  7  
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4  Initial prototype 
4.1  Design features 
The policy editor toolbar is the main focus for interaction (Figure 2).  Users click on buttons in the 
toolbar to open windows - forms that are used to fill in parts of the access control policy.  There is 
one button and form for each part of a PERMIS access control policy - and as a starting point the 
names  for  these  have  been  taken  directly  from  the  technical  language  of  the  PERMIS  policy 
elements.  The Subject policy window is shown in Figure 2.   
Each Grid protected by PERMIS will refer to or contain at least one LDAP directory
§, which is a 
repository  for  the  X.509  attribute  certificates  used  to  store  users’  roles.    The  policy  editor  is 
configured to browse these LDAP directories, and represent them as trees (see the tree marked 
Directory in the lower quadrant of Figure 2) in its domain windows (activated by the Subject, 
SOA, and Target buttons in the toolbar).   
In  normal  operation  the  user  browses  the  directory  tree  until  (s)he  finds  the  desired  entry  (for 
example University College London Department of Computer Science), which can be double clicked 
to enter it into the LDAP DN field.  The user indicates that this DN should be included in the 
Subject policy by clicking the Include button.  The policy writer then types a nickname for the 
Subject domain he is defining in the Domain ID field, for example “UCL”, which he will have to 
refer to in other windows.  The information is added to the policy by clicking the OK button, and the 
window is then closed by clicking the Close button.   
 
 
                                                        
§ the Grid may use an external LDAP directory – e.g. LDAP directory of a collaborating institution. In 
extreme cases a Grid may not need its own LDAP server, but usually it does. 
Figure 1 - A brief PERMIS policy, in XML form. 8        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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In some cases the LDAP directories may not be available for some reason
**, so no LDAP tree will 
appear in the window.  The user will then have to type in DNs into the LDAP DN field from 
memory instead of seeing, pointing and clicking. 
The  two  most  important policy  windows are the  Target  Access policy  window  and the  Role 
Assignment window (Figure 3). These two windows refer to policy items defined in the other 
windows by using combo-boxes (see SOA, Roles, and to this Subject Domain boxes in Figure 3).  
The combo-boxes contain the ID nicknames users created in previous windows - so for example if 
the user typed UCL into the Domain ID field in Figure 2, it could be selected in the to this Subject 
 
 
                                                        
** Some of the reasons are: a) security restrictions – LDAP directory may not be publicly browsable, b) 
firewalls - attempting to connect from a location disallowed by the institutional policy, c) network 
unavailability – the manager is working on the policy whilst on a plane or train 
 
Figure 2 - Example screenshot from the initial prototype, showing the main interface buttons in 
the policy editor toolbar, and the Subject policy window, closely resembling the windows for 
SOA, and Target policies. LDAP directories can be expanded and collapsed (lower left-hand 
corner of window). .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  9  
 
 
 
Copyright ©  2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.    Softw. Prac. Exper. 2000:00:1-7 
 
domain combo-box in Figure 3, indicating that the user was referring to the Subject domain he 
defined as University College London’s Computer Science Department. 
4.2  Efficiency with intermediate to expert users 
Informal comparative evaluation by usability researchers and PERMIS developers showed that the 
first prototype dramatically improved the efficiency with which PERMIS policies could be written.  
At least one developer reported that policy creation times were shortened by more than 50%.  The 
prototype therefore showed the planned improvement in usability for users who are familiar both 
with it and PERMIS policies - predicting a considerable increase in productivity for intermediate and 
expert users.   
It was therefore decided to focus further development efforts on increasing the speed with which 
novice users could progress to intermediate status, by lowering the conceptual barrier that they 
would have to overcome to use the tool effectively.   
4.3  Usability trial study 
Three researchers from UCL were recruited (2 computer scientists and a biological anthropologist).  
They were similar to the target user group – e-Scientists – in that they were new to PERMIS and did 
not have specialist knowledge of computer security, but were numerate and involved in the scientific 
process.   
There is ongoing debate within the HCI community as to appropriate numbers of participants for 
usability trials, which seeks to minimise costs by recruiting the fewest participants that will give 
useful  results.    Proponents  of  discount  usability  methods  have  drawn  curves  of  proportions  of 
usability  problems  found  against  numbers  of  participants  per  trial.    They  claim  that  greatest 
cost/benefits ratios are obtained with between 3 and 5 participants, that 3 participants will uncover 
approximately 70% of usability issues, and that additional participants bring diminishing returns [15] 
[14].  It has been argued that assumptions underlying the curve are optimisitic, do not take into 
account the variablility between participants and tasks, and that more participants are likely to be 
required  [27].    Some  practitioners  recommend  4-6  participants  when  participants  are  asked  to 
achieve predetermined goals during the trial (i.e. write a policy to do X) rather than achieve their 
own  goals (i.e.  write  any  policy)  [e.g.  24],  while  others  only  feel  comfortable  with  8  [cf. 19].  
However, the greatest risk of using few participants is of missing important usability problems [11] 
rather than of giving the problems discovered an importance they do not warrant.  Conclusions based 
on 3 participants (this user trial) and 5 participants (the final prototype’s user-trial) entail a larger 
risk that usability problems discovered are illusory than trials with more participants, and caution 
should be used in generalising from them to all e-Scientists.  The greater risk however, is that these 
trials will not find all the important usability problems, and that some will remain undetected. 
The three participants were given specifications for a simple access control policy and 15 minutes to 
implement it using the prototype policy editor.  Audio was recorded during the session, and video 
taken using screen recording software.   
The  test  specification  could  be  implemented  by  the  test  facilitator  in  5  minutes.    None  of  the 
participants completed the specification after 15 minutes.  One participant, a Grid developer, was 
given extra time and had not finished implementing the specification after 30 minutes when the trial 
was stopped. 
There were several reasons that participants found it difficult to complete the task.  We address the 
most fundamental of these below, i.e. problems relating to users not knowing what needs to be done.   
Toolbar and window labels.  None of the participants understood the label SOA.  Two of the 
participants did not understand RBAC.  One of the participants thought that what should have been 
entered into the SOA window was a role that should in fact be defined in the Role Hierarchy 
policy.  One of the participants correctly identified the purpose of the Subject and Targets policies, 
but ascribed the purpose of the Subject policy to the Target policy, and vice versa. 10        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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These  issues  point  to  a  fundamental  problem.    In  order  to  formalise  one’s  access  control 
requirements into a machine enforceable policy, one must understand how the policy space has been 
structured, and divided into parts.  Since the users are not security specialists, they should be guided 
to consider aspects of access control policy they may not otherwise have thought of.  Critically, they 
must be guided to form policies that are complete with respect to the infrastructure’s requirements, 
so that the resulting policies are enforceable.  We label this as the policy components problem – or 
as one user said, “R-what?”. 
We  believe  that  the  most  probable  outcome  of  the  policy  components  problem  will  be  as  we 
observed in the trial – users being unable to write working policies - their policies are incomplete 
and so the authorisation infrastructure cannot interpret them sufficiently to enforce them.  In the 
PERMIS infrastructure, having no policy to enforce leads to a fail-safe outcome – all users are 
denied access.  While this is a negative outcome, it is at least easy to detect.   
A more pernicious problem would be if users’ misunderstanding of policy components caused them 
to write policies that create significant security holes.  For example, policies that give user-level 
access to the wrong people (potentially jeopardising confidentiality, integrity and availability), or 
make the wrong people SOAs.  We believe that the greatest risk of mistaken policy components 
would be from users misunderstanding the scope of the Subject and SOA components as being larger 
than they are meant to be – for example, they may define the Grid users as Salford University rather 
than Salford University’s Information Systems Institute.  With these kinds of faulty policies, the 
vulnerability is that more people have been given the potential to get access to the Grid than is 
desirable  or  intended.    However,  the  PERMIS  system  has  some  safeguards  against  these 
vulnerabilities being exploited by attackers - a mistaken policy is a necessary but not sufficient 
requirement for attackers to gain access.  For example, to have access, as well as being granted the 
ability to become a Grid user by a faulty policy, attackers would also need to have a digital role AC 
 
Figure 3 - The Role Assignment policy window (The initial prototype).  Combo-boxes contain 
the IDs created by users in other windows, so that policy items defined in these other windows 
can be referred to. .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  11  
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generated for them and stored for them in the Grid’s LDAP directory; PERMIS splits policy writing 
from AC generation/distribution with the intention that they are done by separate people - the digital 
role AC necessary for the attack therefore may not be supplied.  From what we have observed we 
believe there is little risk from these kinds of mistaken policies.  In our limited sample, when users’ 
mental models of the policy components were wrong, they were  wrong in kind rather than extent.  
However, the policy components problem remains a source of vulnerability.  
Exclude button.  The specification required that “people from Germany be prevented from using a 
resource”, which would have been the case without any action on the users’ part - PERMIS denies 
all access except that which has been explicitly allowed.  The only participant who attempted this 
part of the specification incorrectly tried to define a Subject domain with Germany as an excluded 
node.  This mistake showed that the user did not fully understand the function of the Exclude button 
(see Figure 2), since Exclude can only be used after a superior node has been included.  However, 
this pointed to a more fundamental misunderstanding.  By attempting to exclude something that was 
mentioned nowhere else in the policy, the user showed they did not understand it was excluded by 
default, and therefore that the user did not understand the underlying deny all access except nature of 
PERMIS policies
††.   
This misunderstanding is another fundamental block to creation of access control policies, which we 
label the policy paradigm problem.  This will be a common issue for people who are not intimately 
familiar with access control lists or similar mechanisms.  They will not know what objects they 
should put into the policy, and what they should leave out.  We predict that most novice users would 
have a mental model of the policy paradigm as similar to explicitly grant and deny access.  In most 
cases  this  would  lead  to  inefficient  creation  of  workable  policies  –  where  users  unnecessarily 
explicitly deny access to groups of users who would be denied access simply by not mentioning 
them in the PERMIS policy.  The resulting policy would achieve what the users intended, but be 
longer than it needed to be.   
In rare cases where users have a mistaken grant all access except conception of the policy paradigm, 
we believe it would lead to users writing non-functioning policies, rather than insecure ones: actions 
intended to deny access to unwanted groups of people (under the assumption that the desired access 
is granted by default) will fail to grant the desired access in PERMIS.  This is another fail-safe 
condition, which is easily detected by policy writers – no-one would be given access by the resulting 
policy.   
Another fundamental issue is the problem of unique naming.  In contrast to the policy paradigm and 
components problems, it is not a problem of knowing what needs to be done.  Users intuitively 
understand that unique names must be given in access control policies.  It is a problem of knowing 
how to do what needs to be done.  None of the participants were able to write syntactically correct 
LDAP distinguished names (DNs) to refer to authorisation Targets, Subject domains or Sources Of 
Authority  –  all  core  tasks  in  writing  PERMIS  access  control  policies.    Whereas  the  policy 
components and paradigm problems would be serious in all predicted uses of the policy editor, the 
correctly  formed  LDAP  DN  problem  observed  was  an  artefact  due  to  not  yet  implemented 
functionality - point and click DN entry from a browsable directory (see Figure 2).  This problem 
would not usually occur when the missing functionality is present, as will be demonstrated in the 
final prototype’s user-trial.  Only in unusual circumstances would a Grid’s LDAP directory not be 
browsable.  However, users’ inability to manually enter DNs is a cause of concern should this 
circumstance arise. 
 
 
                                                        
†† The observed use of the Exclude button on Germany would have been correct if a superior node had 
first been included.  However, a superior node was available (“Directory” –see Figure 2) and the user did 
not seek to include it nor create an alternative superior node such as “the world” to include. 12        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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5  The final prototype 
Several rounds of  evaluation  and  improvements   were  made during  the policy  editor's iterative 
development.    A  summary  of  the  findings,  and  resulting  changes  to  the design of  the  GUI,  is 
presented in this section. 
5.1  Design features 
The final prototype retains the overall look and feel of the initial prototype.  However, to tackle the 
policy components problem, an effort was made to make the language in its interface more intuitive 
for people with little background in RBAC and PERMIS.  Steps were also taken to tackle the policy 
paradigm problem.  Work on the language in the policy editor’s UI will be described first. 
5.1.1  Promoting understanding of policy components 
A user’s initial interaction with the policy components is through the labels in the policy editor’s UI, 
supplemented by bubble help.  In the first prototype, these were from the technical language of role-
based  access  control.    Specialist  technical  language  - jargon  -  serves  an  important  purpose  for 
experts, offering shorthand for well-understood concepts and signalling membership of a group of 
whose members share a certain level of understanding.  However, non-expert users naturally refer to 
the everyday meaning of terms that serve as shorthand to experts.  The resulting misunderstandings 
are a source of error and frustration.  Explaining the meaning of terms is not a solution: non-experts 
do not understand the underlying concepts in sufficient depth, and with infrequent use, the everyday 
meaning of a term will always be the first one that comes to mind. Jargon will always be a source of 
error and frustration for non-experts.  Computer security has produced many examples of labellings 
that prove difficult and misleading for non-expert users. Encryption, which uses terms such as “key”, 
“public”,  and  “private”  in  a  different  way  than  suggested  by  everyday  language,  is  a  primary 
example [26].  Rather than making users acquire the extensive knowledge that would enable them to 
use jargon – i.e. turning them into experts, usability techniques can be applied to re-label concepts in 
a way that suggests correct actions. 
Conceptual design (CD) is a well-known HCI technique that taps into the language and models of 
users [17].  Many users require labels that imply concepts that are already known to them, using 
words from their everyday language with meanings that are analogous to the technical concepts.  
New users are unlikely to have natural language that exactly matches the tightly defined technical 
concepts of access control – there are likely to be areas where the existing concepts do not imply 
enough of the technical concepts to be useful, and even areas where natural language extends beyond 
the technical concepts in misleading and unhelpful ways.  For example, users were confused by the 
public and private "keys" in PGP that do not work like keys as the users knew them, and this was 
one of the reasons users were so unsuccessful in using PGP to send encrypted email [cf. 26].  We 
therefore used Conceptual Design to select labels from users natural language, to make the policy 
components intuitive to e-Scientists - our target user group.   
The metaphor evaluation matrix [cf. 1] is one of the key methods in Conceptual Design.  The matrix 
(Table  2)  was  applied  to  candidate  labels  (including  those  used  in  the  first  prototype).    This 
qualitative technique requires the analyst to fill cells in the matrix for a label or metaphor through a 
process  of  guided  introspection,  taking  the  user’s  point  of  view  [5].    Empirical  techniques 
(interviews, questionnaires, etc.) can be used to supplement introspection if required.   
Labels such as Users, Managers, Resources, and Access Control give large improvements in 
the amount of supported functionality that they imply (i.e. M+P+ cell entries) compared to the 
technical language of the initial prototype.  For example, the initial prototype’s Subject label would 
imply specification of something to which the policy applied, but would not be enough for a non-
specialist  user  to  understand  what  kind  of  thing  should  be  specified.    However,  a  candidate 
alternative for this label - Users - would imply the specification of persons who wish to use the 
protected resource - almost a perfect match for the functionality of this policy component. .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  13  
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However, the analysis suggested that some of the candidate labels contained conceptual baggage 
that would cause misunderstandings with some users.  For example: Users implies the specification 
of individual persons who wish to use a protected resource - something which cannot be specified in 
PERMIS policies, because PERMIS policies give access to roles rather than individuals.   
A questionnaire was designed to test the intuitiveness of two candidate versions of labels – label 
versions 2 and 3.  Version 2 labels were our team’s intuitive attempt to create better labels, as a 
result of the initial user trial.  Version 3 labels were the result of applying the metaphor evaluation 
matrix, using version 2 labels as a starting point.  Each questionnaire was in two sections.  The first 
section gave the labels and a policy goal, and asked respondents to describe and give an example of 
what should go in the relevant window.  This gave a sense of respondents understanding of PERMIS 
functionality from knowing the labels alone. The second section of the questionnaire gave each label 
a different policy goal, and policy statements that had been derived from the goal - one per label.  
Respondents were asked to match labels to policy statements by drawing a line between them.  This 
measurement is similar to the preceding one but gives respondents extra cues that are like those that 
would be available when looking at the actual prototype. 
A call to participate was sent out by email to UCL’s and the University of Cambridge’s internal 
mailing  lists  for  people  who  were  interested  in  e-Science  (predominantly  e-Scientists,  system 
administrators and e-Science researchers/developers)– approximately 207 people.  In addition, a call 
to participate was sent out to the TrustCoM project (80 people), and 3 people who had downloaded 
PERMIS and had previously answered a requirements questionnaire.  No material inducements were 
given to participate (entry into a prize draw, etc.).  8 responses were received, giving a response rate 
of 2.8%.  This result will be used in the Discussion section as an index of our user group’s interest in 
security. 
The scores for each questionnaire section were aggregated.  Version 2 labels scored an average of 
9.25 out of 16 (57.8%; minimum score = 6.5, maximum =10.5), and version 3 labels scored an 
average  of  13.9 out  of 16  (86.7%;  minimum  score  =12,  maximum  =16).    This  difference  was 
statistically significant (paired t=6.28, df=7, p=.000 two tailed), showing that version 3 labels are 
more intuitive than version 2 labels, with a large effect size (f=0.78). 
The improvements in intuitiveness scores of individual labels varied greatly between versions two 
and three (Table 3).  User privileges, Account administrator privileges, Where users are from 
and Resource functionality showed particularly good improvements. The relatively low score for 
Resource  functionality  in  particular  was  a  matter  of  concern,  leading  to  a  reassessment  and 
production of a revised set of labels (see Figure 4). 
5.1.2  Tackling the policy paradigm problem 
We pursued two techniques against the policy paradigm problem: instructional text in the GUI, and 
UI behaviour.  Both these were supplemented by work we had done with labels for the policy 
components problem. 
Instructional text was added to a prominent part of the GUI to improve users’ understanding of the 
nature of PERMIS’ policy paradigm (see red text at bottom of Figure 6).  This text was placed in the 
first window that we expected users to interact with, based on our observations during the initial 
prototype's user trials.  All of the users from these trials had opened this window as the first thing 
they'd done.  However, we could not guarantee that all future users would do so, nor that opening the 
window guaranteed that the users would read the text.  We therefore supplemented this with GUI 
behaviour in the windows where users where at risk of the policy paradigm problem. 
Figure 5 shows the UI elements common to all windows where users could fall foul of the problem.  
Our goal was to encourage novice users to grant access by selecting DNs and clicking the Include 
button.  This built upon the labels chosen to combat the policy components problem, for example: 
Where users are from.  This label implies the selection of DNs that would be granted access, 
further implying that they do not already have access, leading to the conclusion that PERMIS denies 
all access except (contrast this with a hypothetical label Where users are not from). 14        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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This clear message is complicated by the presence of an Exclude button, which implies a grant and 
deny access paradigm.  However, the Exclude button is useful; it represents advanced functionality 
for  intermediate  to  expert users.   It  allows  users  to  speed  up policy  creation  where part  of  an 
organisation should be granted access and other parts should be denied it.  In a simple example, 
using the Exclude button could do this in two steps, by granting access to the University of Salford 
and removing access from its Maths department.  Without the Exclude button, each department 
would have to be individually granted access.  This would require as many steps as departments and 
be a much more laborious task.   
We therefore wanted to prevent novice users from misusing the Exclude button - explicitly using it 
on all the users they did not want to grant access.  This erroneous behaviour would not compromise 
the intended effect of the policy, but would be grossly inefficient, perhaps causing users to lose faith 
in the software.  The same policy outcome could be achieved simply by not mentioning these users 
in the policy - PERMIS would deny them access by default.   
To prevent incorrect use of the Exclude button, it is greyed out until a DN has been included.  
Moreover,  users  are  forced  to  employ  the  Exclude  button  correctly:  for  example,  the  Maths 
department can only be excluded if the University of Salford is already included and also selected – 
  M+  M- 
P+ 
Desirable 
Features provided by the policy component and 
supported by the metaphor. 
Leads to correct use of system. 
 
Undesirable 
Features  provided  by  the  policy 
component  but  not  supported  by  the 
metaphor. 
Leads to underused features. 
P- 
Very undesirable 
Features  implied  by  the  metaphor  but  not 
supported by the policy component: Conceptual 
baggage 
Leads to user errors. 
 
Not important 
Features not implied by the metaphor and 
not supported by the policy component 
Table 2 - A metaphor evaluation matrix  [cf. 1].  M+, metaphor implies, M-, metaphor does not 
imply; P+, policy component supports, P-, policy component does not support. 
Version 3 Labels  % correct  Version 2 Labels  % correct 
User privileges   84.4  Access control   21.9 
Account administrator privileges   87.5  Role allocations   37.5 
Account administrators  87.5  Managers   81.3 
User types   84.4  Roles   56.3 
Where users are from  100.0  Users   43.8 
My protected resources  90.6  Resources   90.6 
Resource functionality  59.4  Actions   37.5 
Policy object ID  100.0  Policy number   93.8 
Table 3 - Intuitiveness of version 2 and 3 labels.  Percentage correct is the proportion of correct 
questionnaire responses for each label. 8 respondents answered two questions about each label. .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  15  
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binding the two DNs in a hierarchical pair.  Any other use of the Exclude button results in an error 
message that instructs users how to employ it correctly. 
5.2  Usability trial study 
Five numerate postgraduates went through the trial, having 40 minutes to implement two access 
control policies to our specifications – one exercising basic functions of the policy editor, and the 
other some of its more advanced features.  Both the test specifications could be completed by the test 
facilitator in a total of 7 minutes.   
Two  users  successfully  implemented  the  whole  of  specification  one,  with  the  other  three  users 
completing 85%, 69%, and 46% of its tasks (the user scoring 46% abandoned the trial early), giving 
an aggregate task completion rate of 80% for basic tasks in policy creation.  Four users went on to 
the second specification.  Two of these users successfully completed the whole of specification two, 
with the other two users completing 67% and 33% of its sub tasks within the available time.  This 
gives an aggregate task completion rate of 75% for advanced tasks (excluding the user who did not 
attempt them). 
This usability trial showed that changes made to the UI had resulted in meaningful improvements in 
areas where there had been problems observed in the earlier user trial: 
Policy components problem.  Users completed tasks successfully requiring the understanding of all 
of the policy components that caused problems in the first user trial.  This showed that the labelling 
was much more intuitive than in the initial prototype.  The task completion rates for basic policy 
tasks varied for each toolbar label, and are shown in Table .  
Though much more successful than the initial prototype, a small systematic problem was observed 
with the final labels.  A small proportion of users attempted to enter themselves into the policy as 
having  the  power  to  write  policy,  showing  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  of  the  Account 
Administrators policy component and PERMIS architecture more generally.  It is not clear if this 
problem  of  user  self-reference  is  caused  by  conceptual  baggage  with  the  label  Account 
Administrators, or something else, for example: a deeper clash between the users’ underlying model 
of  authorisation  and  the  PERMIS  architecture.    If  it  is  the  former,  then  it  may  be  avoided by 
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choosing a different label.  If it is the latter, then explicit education may be required such as tutorials 
(which many users avoid), or even architectural change. 
Policy paradigm problem.  A task was built into both user trials to test whether users understood 
the deny all access except nature of PERMIS policies, which had been an area of concern for the 
design team.  If users did understand, they would avoid using the Exclude button in this task, 
whereas if the UI design caused them to misunderstand, users would mistakenly use the Exclude 
button in the task.  In the initial prototype’s user trial, only one user got far enough to attempt this 
task, and failed it.  Changes were made to labelling and UI behaviour to make the deny all access 
except nature of PERMIS more clear, and in the final prototype's user trial four out of five users 
passed the task. 
Unique names problem. In the initial prototype's user trial, none of the participants were able to 
write correct distinguished names (DNs) to refer to authorisation Target and Subject domains or 
Sources Of Authority.  The final prototype implemented point-and-click selection of these policy 
items.  
Table  shows that users of the final prototype were much more successful at entering correct DNs.  
Only one of the users in this trial already had experience of LDAP and DNs, however, the average 
task completion rate for DN tasks with the final prototype was four out of five users successful.  Its 
point-and-click UI for LDAP DNs greatly contributes to usability in the PERMIS policy editor.   
 
Figure 5 - UI behaviour tackling the policy paradigm problem 
 
Figure 6 - Explanatory text in the UI laying out the underlying nature of PERMIS policies. 
(Prototype 2) .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  17  
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6  Discussion 
We set out to improve the usability of the PERMIS system for writing authorisation policies for e-
Scientists.  This was achieved by employing 4 techniques: 
Allocation of function - the task of writing XML was reallocated from the user to software, thus 
producing a large increase in the efficiency with which intermediate and expert users could create 
policies. 
Usability trials - identified particular features of the UI that could be altered to improve the speed 
which novice users could appreciate the functions of different parts of the software. 
Conceptual  design  -  generated  design  ideas  and  informed  design  decisions  for  improving 
learnability for novice users, and so lowering the costs of adopting the software. 
Low fidelity prototyping/questionnaire studies - were used to test design ideas without using 
precious programming resources. 
Along  the  way,  the  project  team  identified  and  addressed  three  generic  problems  in  making 
authorisation policy creation tools usable: 
(i)  Policy components problem.   
(ii)  Policy paradigm problem.   
(iii)  Unique names problem. 
Our user trials show that we have met with some success.  PERMIS has a sophisticated and therefore 
complex model of authorisation, and yet users were able to implement much of two authorisation 
policies with no training or access to documentation, and in a short time.  We feel that the approach 
we have taken is necessary, has yielded a better tool, and a better understanding of what users need 
in order to write authorisation policies.   
However, we believe that even better usability can be achieved by carrying on this work with the 
techniques we have used.  There is a tension between designing a simple system image for novice 
users, and the complexity added to this image by advanced features for intermediate and expert 
users.  This was evident in our experience of the policy paradigm problem: the Exclude button was 
an advanced feature that contravened the PERMIS deny all access except paradigm. It confused 
some novice users, causing them to write a policy less efficiently than they might, and frustrated 
them by receiving unexpected error messages.  Further gains in usability may be made by exploring 
alternate  labels  for  these  advanced  features.    The  standard  HCI  technique  of  hiding  advanced 
features (under Advanced buttons, for example) may also be useful.   
Policy component   No. users completing task 
(out of 5). 
Policy Object ID  4  (80%) 
Where Users Are From  4.5*  (90%) 
Account Administrators  3.5*  (70%) 
Users Roles  5*  (100%) 
Account Administrators Privileges  4*  (80%) 
My Protected Resources  4  (80%) 
Resources Functions  4  (80%) 
Users Privileges  2  (40%) 
Table 4 - Task completion for each policy component in the final prototype, specification 1.  
*Average of two tasks 18        S.BROSTOFF, ET AL.     
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Our test bed held a small namespace of individuals, organisations and resources.  When deployed in 
the real world, authorisation systems’ naming UI will face a much more difficult test.  Users will 
have to contend with problems such as several people in the same directory having the same first 
name  and  surname  [8].   This  may be  complicated by the  technology  used  in the directory,  for 
example LDAP.   Despite being pervasive, LDAP  has several open  issues  which it  may  not be 
possible  to  overcome  using  the  usability  techniques  we  have  employed,  for  example:  common 
components  of  LDAP  DN’s  (such  as  Organisational  Unit  or  Locality)  are  ambiguous  in  many 
circumstances [8], and so may increase the difficulty of locating an individual rather than making it 
easier.   
We believe that our efforts have led to a tool that will allow novice users to create safe policies - 
they will either work as the users intended or deny access to everyone.  However, more work is 
required to validate this.  In addition, our belief is based on novice users implementing policies to 
our specifications.  We have not yet studied novice users generating policy goals for themselves.  Do 
novice users require support in formulating policy goals to meet their own and their organisations’ 
needs?  What knowledge and experience is required to do this?  What tools could be built to supply 
them?   
We have found that once the users’ fundamental (policy components and paradigm) problems of 
what-needs-to-be-done to write access control policy have been identified and addressed, thorny 
problems still remain - users have to work out how to do what they now know needs doing.  Small 
aspects of UI design can help or hinder this stage of policy writing, and we would have liked to have 
been able to employ more of the conventional HCI techniques to make this even easier.   
The project team noted a number of points during this development that other e-Science security 
projects  may  wish  to  consider.    Incorporating  established  usability  techniques  improved  our 
development process and our resulting software (see above), and having usability specialists on the 
team made this easier.  In particular, we found that testing often and early was of benefit, as it gave 
us  powerful  insights  into  design  when  we  had  resources  to  do  something  about  them.    The 
availability of usability data from testing shortened the debate about design decisions.  In contrast, 
design  discussions  could  become  quite  drawn-out  where  data  was  not  available.  This  was 
particularly an issue with the analytic (rather than empirical) usability technique heuristic evaluation 
[12] [13], which we later found to have made valid predictions. 
We  were  surprised  by  the  difficulty  of  recruiting  test  participants  from  among  the  e-Science 
community - our calls for participation had a 2.8% response rate for questionnaire studies (see 
section 5.1.1), and a 0% response rate for usability trials.  User trials could only be conducted by 
using face-to-face meetings for recruiting.  As a result, we were not able to achieve the level of 
testing or the confidence in our results we desired, and this made our development process more 
difficult.  PERMIS and e-Science are relatively new - there were few members of an existing user 
group that would be motivated by self-interest (in having improved software) to take part in testing - 
participation in usability trials can take up to an hour.  We were forced to create low impact test 
instruments  to  make participation  more  attractive  -  short  questionnaires  that  implemented  some 
aspects  of  low  fidelity prototype  testing.    However,  we  found these  to be an  excellent  way of 
collecting data - quick, cheap, informative, and requiring no programming resource.  Having other 
means  of  attracting  test  participants  would  have  been  beneficial  -  budgeting  to  pay  for  test 
participants, or having a large group of project partners who could be put under social or contractual 
pressure  to  participate.    Future  projects  may  make  more  extensive  use  of  usability  inspection 
methods  -  such  as  heuristic  evaluation  and  cognitive  walk-through  or  its  more  streamlined 
derivatives [25]- which do not require any test participants, but can identify significant numbers of 
issues revealed by usability trials [7]. 
Though  creating  difficulties  for  our  testing  activities,  the  low  response  rate  has  validated  our 
approach and focus on usability to create an easy access, lightweight authoring tool.  Participating in 
our studies would have taken our users relatively little effort, yet their enthusiasm for participating 
was significant in its absence.  A similar, if not greater, amount of effort would have been required 
to learn the original policy components and UI before the HCI makeover, but this is an effort that 
these users are clearly not willing to make (unless they have to).   .  “R-WHAT?” DEVELOPMENT OF AN RBAC TOOL FOR E-SCIENTISTS  19  
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Whilst some usability interventions (such as reallocation of function of XML creation from the user 
to the computer) required deep changes to our software - other improvements were almost cosmetic 
in terms of the coding required to implement them (changes to button labels lead by conceptual 
design).  These label changes nevertheless brought significant improvements to usability.  Good 
software  engineering  practices  made  these  improvements  easier  to  implement  -  however,  such 
practices have much wider benefits, for example making software localisation more efficient. 
The utility of our questionnaire studies showed that it was not necessary to have working code to get 
useful design data.  We conclude that in some instances it can be preferable to test in the absence of 
a working prototype, as design ideas can be tested without throwing code away [24].  This leads to 
the conclusion that testing and freezing of UI designs should be done as much as possible before 
coding begins, or if not then as early as possible - giving the developers greater flexibility in design, 
and a more efficient and often more rewarding software engineering process [6].   
There is a perception that the difficulty in getting e-Science technology to work drives security 
considerations to the back of the queue, and that security mechanisms impede application users 
rather than support them.  This perception causes users to find ways of subverting the security 
mechanism  [22].    We  feel  that  incorporating  usability  principles  and  techniques  into  the 
development  of e-Science security software  can make it  more  attractive  to the  wider e-Science 
community, by lowering the entry barrier, increasing its uptake and appropriate use. 
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